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THE CONSERVATION/FREE TRADE DEBATE 
RESURFACES: 
The Uncertain Intersection of the 1992 Driftnet 
Fisheries Act and GATT 
PAUL STANTON KIBEL* 
INTRODUCTION 
The intersection of domestic environmental legislation and in-
ternational free trade has emerged as a zone of legal uncertainty. 
On one hand, there are national conservation statutes, such as the 
Endangered Species Act, l Marine Mammal Protection Act,2 and 
the recent High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act. 3 These 
Acts seek to promote global conservation and protection by placing 
trade sanctions on nations that fail to maintain certain environmen-
tal standards. On the other hand, there are international free trade 
agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade4 
• Third-year student, WiIIamette University College of Law. B.A., Colgate Univer-
sity, 1989. 
1. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-34 (1973). 
2. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1361 (1972). 
3. High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, 102 P.L. 582, 106 Stat. 4900 (1992) 
[hereinafter Driftnet Fisheries Act]. 
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAlT]. 
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and the Canada Free Trade Agreement. S These agreements seek to 
promote global economic development by disallowing and restrict-
ing the use of trade sanctions. Over time, conservationists and free 
trade advocates will synthesize and integrate their international 
policy efforts. At present, however, inconsistencies and disparities 
exist. This difficult intersection between the two was clearly evi-
denced in the 1991 dolphin-tuna dispute between Mexico and the 
United States. 
The dispute began with the United States' decision to ban the 
import of Mexican tuna products6 as a result of Mexican violations 
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMP A). 7 The MMP A 
requires that trade sanctions be placed on nations who refuse to 
adopt fishing practices that minimize the incidental killing of dol-
phins and other marine mammals.8 Mexico responded to the ban 
by alleging that the MMP A trade sanctions were inconsistent with 
the United States free trade obligations under GATT. 9 Mexico and 
the United States, both signatories to GATT, submitted the issue to 
a GATT special panel. 10 The panel concluded that the MMP A em-
bargo provisions were inconsistent with GAIT requirements and 
issued a formal recommendation that the "United States bring the 
measures into conformity with its obligation under the General 
Agreement." 11 
Although this decision was well received in the international 
community, it was met with anger and defiance by those involved 
in environmental and pro-conservation efforts in the United 
5. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, H.R. Rep. No. 216, l00th Cong. 2d 
Sess. at 297-541, (1988), reprinted in 27 ILM 281 (1988). 
6. The prohibition against the import of Mexican tuna was a result of a order by the 
District Court for the Northern District of California, Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 
746 F.Supp 964 (N.D. Cal 1990), aff'd 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). This case was 
brought by a conservation group against the Executive branch for failure to issue statutory 
directives mandating a ban on imported fish. 
7. "The Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial fish or 
products from fish which have been caught with commercial fishing technology which re-
sults in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United 
States standards." 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (Supp. 1991). The MMPA also calls for embar-
goes on intermediary nations who purchase fish products from nations in violation of the 
statute's dolphin-protective requirements. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371(a)(2). 
8. Id. 
9. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report ofthe GATT Panel (Aug. 
16, 1991) reprinted in 30ILM 1594, at 1598. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 1623. 
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States.12 Many conservationists believed that acceptance of the 
GA'IT panel's findings, and adoption of its recommendations, 
would serve to de-claw several crucial pieces of environmental 
legislation. 13 
The clearest expression of domestic hostility to the GAIT 
panel decision, however, is not found in the statements of conser-
vation advocates. Rather, it is found in the legislative response of 
the United States Congress. Within one year of the GAIT panel 
decision, Congress passed the much publicized 1992 High Seas 
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act (Driftnet Fisheries Act).14 The 
Driftnet Fisheries Act went well beyond the mere fish and fish 
product embargoes set forth in the MMP A; the Act provided for 
potential embargoes on all imports, as well as denial of port privi-
leges to offending nations' fishing vessels. IS Thus, notwithstanding 
the GA'IT ruling, the United States has demonstrated its determi-
nation to use domestic legislation to further global resource and 
wildlife conservation. 
The legislative response to the GAIT panel decision has 
raised several troubling questions. Paramount among these is what 
impact do GAIT and the holdings of GAIT panels have on the 
validity of domestic environmental legislation? At present, no clear 
answer to this question has emerged. The international authority 
of GAIT and the domestic authority of numerous conservation 
statutes have become submerged in uncertainty. This Comment 
will explore the legal relationship between GATT and United 
States environmental legislation, employing the 1992 Driftnet Fish-
eries Act as an analytic focus. 
Part I analyzes the 1991 GAIT panel decision, with special 
attention given to those GAIT provisions which were found incon-
sistent with the MMP A. Part II discusses the international and 
12. Environmental groups took the initial lead in denouncing the ruling of the 1991 
GAIT panel. For further discussion of the conservationist response, see Matthew Hunter 
Hurley, The GAIT, u.s. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in 
Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUMBIA L. REv. 2098, 2130 (1992) [hereinafter 
Hurley], and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, AGORA: Trade and Environment, 86 AM. J. INT'L. 
L., 700, 702 (1992) [hereinafter Schoenbaum]. 
13. "The decision calls into question the validity of numerous United States environ-
mental protections statutes that seek to use trade measures to enforce environmental 
goals." David J. Ross, Making GATT Dolphin-Safe: Trade and the Environment, 2 DUKE J. 
CoMP. & INT'L L. 345 (1992) [hereinafter Ross]. 
14. Driftnet Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(1992). 
15. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a) (1992). 
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domestic response to the panel decision. Part III summarizes the 
1992 Driftnet Fisheries Act, focusing on the reasons for its adop-
tion and the trade sanctions it contains. Part IV reveals potential 
inconsistencies between the 1991 GAIT panel decision and the 
Driftnet Fisheries Act. Part V addresses the likely consequences of 
these inconsistencies. Part VI considers strategies for resolving the 
conflict between environmentally-based trade embargoes, such as 
those required under the Driftnet Fisheries Act, and international 
free trade obligations under GAIT. 
I. 1991 GATT PANEL DECISION REGARDING EMBARGOES 
UNDER THE MMPA 
Before discussing the 1991 GATT panel decision, some pre-
liminary comments regarding GAIT may be of use to the reader 
who is unfamiliar with international trade law. GAIT was born in 
1947 in the economic aftermath of World War II. Its primary pur-
pose was, and is, to encourage global economic development by 
limiting the use of tariffs and import restrictions.16 The term 
"GAIT" refers to both an agreement and an ongoing organization. 
The agreement is the initial 1947 document. 17 The ongoing organi-
zation is the administrative body that sits in Geneva, Switzerland. 
The purpose of the organization is to give effect to the terms and 
requirements of the agreement. One way that the organization 
achieves this end is by providing dispute resolution panels in which 
signatory parties can reconcile conflicting interpretations of the 
agreement's provisions. 18 
Mexico and the United States submitted their conflict, i.e., 
whether GAIT provisions and MMPA trade sanctions are com-
patable, to a GATT dispute resolution panel. In reaching its con-
clusion that the MMP A trade sanctions and GAIT are 
inconsistent, the panel pointed to four primary GATT provisions; 
Article 111(4), Article XI(l), Article XX(b), and Article XX(g).19 
16. For extensive discussion of the history of GAIT, see Mark T. Hooley, Resolving 
Conflicts Between the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Domestic Environmental 
Laws, 18 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REv. 483, 485 [hereinafter Hooley) 
17. GAIT supra note 4. 
18. GAIT, supra note 4, Article XXIII. This GAIT provision does not specifically 
provide for dispute resolution panels, but does provide that GAIT "shall promptly investi-
gate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the 
contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as 
appropriate." 
19. See GAIT Mexican Tuna Panel, supra note 9, at 1623. 
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Article 111(4) states that a GATT contracting nation may em-
ploy domestic regulations affecting the imported products of other 
contracting nations, so long as these regulations do not discrimi-
nate between foreign and domestic products.20 Article XI(1) pro-
vides that subject to certain limited exceptions, a GAIT 
contracting nation shall not impose quantitative import prohibi-
tions or restrictions on the product of another GAIT contracting 
nation.21 Article XX lists the exceptions which justify a deviation 
from the general free trade requirements set forth in Article XI. 
Among these exceptions are the trade restrictions "necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life and health," under Article 
XX(b)22 and those "relating to the conservation of exhaustible nat-
ural resources, under Article XX(g). 23 
Mexico contended that the MMP A embargo violated the gen-
eral free trade requirements under Article XI(1).24 The United 
States responded to this contention with a two-fold argument. 
First, the United States asserted that the MMPA sanctions were 
not trade restrictions, but were "laws, regulations, and require-
ments affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, trans-
portation, distribution or use of yellowfin tuna harvested [via 
dolphin-injuring fishing practices]."25 Because certain domestic 
and internal measures are permitted under Article III, the United 
States maintained that MMP A provisions did not implicate the for-
eign trade-related terms of Article XI(1).26 Second, the United 
States argued that even if the MMPA embargo was found to violate 
Article XI(l), such measures were justified under the conservation-
related exceptions under Article XX(b) and Article XX(g).27 The 
20. GAIT, supra note 4, Article 111(4). The section provides, in relevant part, that 
"internal quantitative control" shall be allowed so long as tbese domestic measures are not 
"modified to tbe detriment of imports." 
21. GAIT, supra note 4, Article XI(I). This section provides, in relevant part: "No 
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges, whether made effec-
tive through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting parties on the importation of any product of the territory of 
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined 
for tbe territory of any other contracting party." 
22. GAIT, supra note 4, Article XX(b). 
23. GAIT, supra note 4, Article XX(g). 
24. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the GAIT Panel 
(Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30lLM 1594, 1601. 
25. ld. at 1602. 
26. ld. at 1603. In support of this interpretation, the United States emphasized that 
MMPA regulations were enforced at the time or point of importation. 
27. Id. at 1605. 
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GAIT dispute resolution panel rejected both of the United States' 
arguments.28 
The first argument presented by the United States failed be-
cause the panel determined that the MMP A embargo applied to 
certain production methods (fishing practices), rather than certain 
products.29 Because Article III(4) was limited to internal regula-
tions relating to products, rather than the particular manner in 
which products were produced, the panel concluded that the provi-
sion was inapplicable. The second United States argument was re-
jected on the grounds that Article XX's conservation exceptions 
were applicable only to resources located within the enforcing na-
tion's jurisdiction. 30 Because the MMP A trade sanctions were 
targeted at resources located outside United States territory, 
namely dolphins in international waters, the panel held that Article 
XX exceptions would not provide a means of reconciling the 
MMPA embargo with GAIT.3l 
In reaching this outcome, the panel clarified that its "task was 
limited to the examination of this matter in light of the relevant 
GAIT provisions, and therefore did not call for a finding on the 
appropriateness of the· United States and Mexico's conservation 
policies as such. '>32 The panel concluded by issuing a recommenda-
tion that the United States amend or modify the MMP A so that it 
conformed with GAIT's free trade obligations.33 
II. REsPONSES TO THE 1991 GAIT PANEL DECISION 
The GAIT dispute resolution panel procedures do not pro-
vide for formal intervention or amicus participation by third par-
ties.34 Despite the lack of formal intervention mechanisms, 
however, GATT has allowed interested third parties to make infor-
mal "submissions". Although these submissions cannot be textu-
28. [d. at 1623. 
29. [d. at 1617. The panel concluded that regulations governing the taking of dol-
phins incidental to the taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product. 
30. Id. at 1620. The panel reasoned that if Article XX exceptions were given the 
broad interpretation advocated by the United States, each contracting nation could unilat-
erally determine the environmental and health protections policies of other contracting 
nations. Such an interpretation would severely undermine the agreement's basic free trade 
guarantees. . 
31. Id. 
32. [d. at 1623 
33. [d.. 
34. See GAIT, supra note 4, Article XXIII. 
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ally relied upon by dispute panels, they provide a means for other 
GATT members to voice opinions on a given controversy. In the 
1991 dispute between Mexico and the United States, 12 nations, as 
well as the European Economic Community, offered such submis-
sions.3s Each of these submissions contended that the MMP A 
trade measures violated GATT free trade requirements.36 More-
over, it should be noted that the list of countries which made these 
submissions was not limited to developing nations, such as Indone-
sia, the Philippines, and Senegal.37 It also included such economi-
cally advanced nations as Australia, Canada, and Japan.38 
Several factors explain the widespread international support 
for the Mexican position and the GAIT panel's subsequent ruling. 
For developing nations, trade sanctions such as those under the 
MMP A are widely perceived as obstacles to second and third world 
economic development.39 This perception, although contested by 
many, has some economic basis in reality. Notwithstanding the 
MMP A's conservationalist intent, requiring less afiiuent nations to 
adhere to the environmental standards of more afiiuent nations 
does prevent the former from allocating funds into other areas of 
their respective economies. 40 The environmentalist contention that 
such an allocation may be in the developing nation's best long-term 
interests, though probably correct, does not provide a persuasive 
response to this complaint. Regardless of any potential beneficial 
effects, the perception of United States economic interference 
remains. 
The welcome reception of the rulings by the developed na-
tions, such as Canada and Japan, can be attributed largely to the 
MMPA's sanctions against intermediary as well as directly viola-
35. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna. Report of the GATT Panel 
(Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM 1594, 1610-15. 
36. Id .. 
37. Ill. at 1613, 1614. 
38. Id. at 1610-14. 
39. !d. at 1613-14. "Indonesia noted the economic importance of its tuna trad~ with 
the United States," and complained that the MMPA trade sanctions were being used as a 
means to shield United States tuna producers from import competition.' Id. Senegal noted 
that the MMPA "embargo had caused Mexico to invade Senegal's traditional markets," 
and that this resulted in a severe fall in Senegal's tuna export revenue. Id. 
40. See Hurley, supra note 12, at 2140. "The United States unilateral trade bans un-
dermine the principle [free trade] by imposing standards upon other countries that reflect 
the cost-benefit analysis of conditions and values in America. Because no negotiations have 
taken place between the U.S. and the regulated country, no consideration is given to the 
particular circumstances of that country." 
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tive nations.41 The MMP A requires that embargoes be enforced 
against not only those countries whose fishing practices fail to con-
form with U.S. standards but, also against those nations who 
purchase tuna from these non-conforming nations.42 In extending 
the sanctions to these intermediary parties, many developed nations 
believed that the United States went considerably beyond what 
GATT alloWS.43 The sanctions against intermediary nations have 
the intended effect of coercing non-violative third parties into 
adopting the same embargo policy as the United States. While 
many developed nations were willing to permit the United States to 
adopt legislation that potentially conflicted with GAIT require-
ments, these nations took issue with trade sanctions which en-
couraged them to do the same.44 
In sharp contrast to the international community's welcome 
reception, the United States greeted the panel decision with anger 
and dismay. This hostility was evidenced not only by the state-
ments of conservationists45 but by the political maneuvering of the 
Legislative and Executive branches. 
Most members of Congress responded to the panel decision by 
pointing the finger at GATT and the inadequacies of its dispute 
resolution processes.46 Senator, then Representative, Barbara 
Boxer (D- CA) sent a letter signed by sixty-two of her House col-
leagues demanding that GATT panel procedures be reformed to 
allow for consideration of environmental protection measures.47 
Henry Waxman, chairperson of the House Subcommittee on 
41. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371 (a) (2). 
42. Id. 
43. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the GATT Panel 
(Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM 1594, 1612. The opposition to the intermediary na-
tion sanctions was set forth in the Canadian, Japanese, and EEe submissions. All three 
maintained that the application of such third party embargoes was inconsistent with 
GATT, and should therefore be disallowed. 
44. Id. at 1612. The EEC took great pains to explain that its position in the present 
dispute should in no way be construed as an effort to hinder international dolphin conser-
vation efforts. In support of this, the EEe pointed to the anti-driftnet measures that it had 
recently adopted. The EEe's objection to the MMPA style sanctions, however, was their 
tendency to impose national-based solutions on the rest of the international community. 
45. See Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade; No Country Can Protect Its 
Own Smidgen 0/ Air or Ocean, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21. In this article, Ma-
thews discusses the environmental impact of the panel ruling and the potential threat of 
invalidation it poses to other domestic conservation laws. 
46. Members 0/ Congress Protest Recent GATT Ruling on u.s. Embargo 0/ Mexican 
Tuna, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1399 (Sept. 25, 1991). 
47. Id. 
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Health and the Environment, called a special hearing to consider 
the potential implications of the ruling.48 At this hearing, Waxman 
called upon the Bush Administration and the United States Trade 
Representative to "change the GAIT law to protect our health and 
environmental protective statutes."49 Moreover, Waxman also ex-
pressed doubt as to whether the Bush Administration had zealously 
and competently argued the United States' position. 50 Waxman's 
concern was warranted given Bush's lack of enthusiasm for global 
environmental protection. 
On the diplomatic front, the Executive Branch, also, took 
steps to quietly diffuse the potential consequences of the GATT 
panel decision. Under the provisions of GATT, Mexico could have 
used the ruling to request trade sanctions and fines against the 
United States. 51 Wishing to avoid such a scenario and with the 
prospects of a completed NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) close at hand, the United States sent a diplomatic en-
voy to Mexico. As a result of these negotiations, Mexico's Presi-
dent Salinas agreed not to pursue the matter further, and the Bush 
Administration promised to push for a means to exempt Mexico 
from the impending tuna embargo. 52 However, this exemption was 
not forthcoming. Congress did not amend or modify the MMP A. 
In January of 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the 
Secretary of the Treasury to institute the MMPA mandated em-
bargo on Mexican tuna. 53 The Bush Administration sought to have 
the court ruling stayed but was unsuccessful. 54 
Therefore, despite the recommendations of the GATT panel 
and the international community's widespread endorsement of the 
ruling, all three branches of the United States have yet to incorpo-
rate its findings. Members of Congress called for changes in 
GATT. The Executive convinced Mexico not to pursue the issue 
48. GAIT: Implications on Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Subcommittee 
on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102d. 
Cong. lst Sess. (Sept. 27, 1991) [hereinafter House Hearing]. The subcommittee heard 
testimony from Joshua Bolten, Counsel for the United States Trade Representative, as well 
as conservationists including Ralph Nader. 
49. Id. at 41. 
50. Id. at 40. 
51. See GAIT, supra note 4, Article VI. 
52. See, e.g., Hurley, supra note 12, at 2131; Ross, supra note 13, at 353. 
53. See Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, (N.D. Cal. 1990), 
aff'd 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). 
54. Appeals Court Lets Tuna Embargo Stand, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at A2. 
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further. The Federal Judiciary has issued an order which evidences 
that the MMP A and its conservation based trade sanctions still are 
valid domestic law. 
III. 1992 HIGH SEAS DRIFTNET FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT 
ACT 
The 1992 Driftnet Fisheries Act was approved, in its predeces-
sor bill form, by the House Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries. This approval immediately followed the House Hearing 
to determine the effect of the GATT ruling on domestic environ-
mental legislation. 55 The bill became law on November 2, 1992.56 
The Act intended to give effect and provide enforcement teeth 
to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 44/225, 45/197, 
and 46/215.57 These international resolutions called for a world-
wide moratorium on all high seas driftnet fishing by December 31, 
1992.58 As with the domestic MMPA, the United Nations ban on 
pelagic driftnets was adopted to prevent the incidental killing of 
dolphins and other non-target marine mammals and birds. 59 
The Driftnet Fisheries Act requires the Secretary of Com-
merce to identify and publish a list of nations whose nationals or 
vessels conduct large-scale driftnet fishing in the international high 
seas.6O Once a nation is placed on this list, there are three conse-
quences that follow. The first two consequences are mandatory, 
the third is discretionary. First, the Act requires that the Secretary 
of the Treasury deny all port privileges to any large-scale driftnet 
fishing vessel that is registered under the laws of a listed nation.61 
Second, the President is required to direct the Secretary of the 
Treasury to prohibit the importation of all fish, fish products and 
sport fishing equipment from such a nation.62 Third, if it is deter-
55. See H.R. 2152, \o2d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). A companion bill was introduced in 
the Senate. S. 884, \o2d. Cong., 1st 50S. (1991). 
56. Driftnct Fisheries Act, ~uprQ notc 3. 
57. Drifnte Fisherio Act, suprQ nOle 3, § 2 (a)(4) and Sec. 2(b)(I), These sections of 
the Driflnet Fisheries Act set forth the findings and policies relating to the law's adoption. 
58. See United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on Large Scale Pelagic 
Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World Oceans and 
Seas, 44/225 December 22, 1989, reprinted in 29 ILM 1555 (\990), 45/197 (1990), and 
UNGOR 46/215 December 20, 1991, reprinted in 31 ILM 241 (1992). 
59. See Driftnet Fisheries Act, supra note 3. 
60. Driftnet Fisheries Act, supra note 3, Sec. 101 (a)(1). 
61. Id., § 101 (a)(2). 
62. Id.. § 101 (b)(3). 
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mined by the Secretary of Commerce that these mandatory sanc-
tions are insufficient to cause such nations to tenninate the use of 
pelagic driftnets, the Secretary may impose restrictions on "any 
products from the offending country for any duration."63 
The sanctions set forth under the Driftnet Fisheries Act go 
considerably beyond the measures called for in the earlier MMPA. 
Mandatory imperatives have replaced discretionary possibilities,64 
and the range of potentially prohibited products has been signifi-
cantly broadened.65 The sanctions adopted in the act clearly sug-
gest that conformity and consistency with GATT were not the 
order of the day. If anything, the timing and boldness of the 
Driftnet Fisheries Act indicate a congressional willingness to 
openly disregard the findings and recommendations of the 1991 
GATT panel ruling. 
IV. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE 1991 GATT PANEL 
DECISION AND EMBARGO PROVISIONS OF THE 1992 
DRIFTNET FISHERIES ACT 
In considering inconsistencies between the 1991 GATT panel 
decision and the trade sanctions called for in the 1992 Driftnet 
Fisheries Act, it is important to understand that the term "incon-
sistent" is not being used here in the traditional legal sense. Tradi-
tional legal analysis could potentially reconcile domestic 
environmental and free trade requirements through the use of juris-
prudential tools and creative construction. Such creative construc-
tion would remove the inconsistencies and thus remove the textual 
conflict. If this were the issue at hand, there are ample jurispruden-
tial tools to allow for such construction, conclusion, and consis-
tency. Consider the following three examples. 
First, it is not altogether clear what domestic validity GATT 
retains because it never has been given formal advice and consent 
by Congress.66 Thus, one could contend that because GATT is not 
63. Id" § 101 (b)(4)(a). 
64. The MMPA permitted some discretion in terms of when identification and sanc· 
tions were required. This discretion was given judicial recognition in the case of Japan 
Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 418 U.S. 221 (1986). The Driftnet Fisheries Act has 
sought to replace this discretion through the use of more explicit mandatory language. For 
examples of such language. see § 101(a)(2) and § 101(b)(3) of the Act. 
65. Supra note 60. 
66. Without the formal advice and consent of Congress the domestic validity of inter· 
national agreements/treaties is questionable. For detailed consideration of the domestic 
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valid domestic law, the Driftnet Fisheries Act does not violate any 
international treaty obligations. Second, it has been held that Con-
gress may enact subsequent legislation that supersedes a prior inter-
national obligation.67 Thus, one could contend that the Driftnet 
Fisheries Act invalidates the inconsistent obligations under GATT. 
Third, there is no principle of stare decisis in GATT.68 Thus, one 
could contend that the ruling of the 1991 GATT panel has no di-
rect bearing on any detennination relating to the Driftnet Fisheries 
Act. 
While such arguments provide a clever means of achieving for-
mal and theoretical consistency, they fail to resolve any of the prac-
tical and political issues at hand. These arguments fail because the 
international community cares not one whit whether the canons of 
our domestic jurisprudence, such as separation of powers or last in 
time, provide valid justification for refusing to abide by the GATT 
rulings. The only issue that concerns the international community 
is whether the United States is violating the terms of an interna-
tional agreement or disregarding the findings of an international 
dispute panel. Likewise, the absence of stare decisis in the GATT 
ruling is equally irrelevant in the international context. In the in-
ternational Community, the GATT panel's findings were viewed 
not merely as a specific determination but as a general statement 
about the use of certain trade sanctions.69 As Joshua Bolten, Coun-
sel for the United States Trade Representative, stated during the 
House hearing following the 1991 GATT decision, "We do have a 
choice. We can ignore our ·international obligations, but we do so, 
I think, at great cost to some very other important interests. "70 
validity of GA'IT, see Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 479 (1990). 
67. See Hurley, supra note 12, at 2136. "Federal laws passed subsequent to U.S. ratifi-
cations of the GATI, however, are not invalid if they conflict with obligations under the 
agreement because it has long been established that Congress may enact a law that super-
sedes a prior treaty." 
68. House Hearing, supra note 48, at 29. At this hearing, U.S. Trade Representative 
Counsel Joshua Bolten explained, "The GAIT dispute settlement system is one which is 
different from our own court system and similar to international systems in which individ-
ual rulings are taken up on individual facts .... There is no principle in GATI of stare 
decisis where precedent is formed." 
69. EC. Others Pressure u.s., Mexico to Accept GATT Yel/ow./in Tuna Report, Int'l 
Trade Daily (BNA), Mar 19, 1992. 
70. Supra note 48, at 41. Comment was offered in response to Rep. Waxman's charge 
that Bush and U.S. Trade Representative had failed to adequately defend the MMPA 
consistency with GATI. Waxman expressed doubt about the White House's true objec-
tives, and its expectation that Congress would now fall in line and amend. the law. Given 
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The present discussion of inconsistencies is directed, therefore, 
more to perceptions of inconsistency within the international com-
munity. The 1991 GAIT panel held that the MMPA was incom-
patible with GAIT for two primary reasons. First, it sought to 
regulate not the importation of certain products but the use of cer-
tain undesirable, environmentally destructive production meth-
ods.71 While such aims may be laudable, the panel held that they 
are not permitted under Article III of GATT.72 Second, it sought 
to provide for the conservation of resources located outside the ju-
risdiction of the United States.73 Once again, despite the wisdom in 
conserving and protecting global resources, the panel determined 
that such measures are not permissible under GATT.74 These two 
holdings point a boney and condemning finger at the conservation-
based trade sanctions set forth in the Driftnet Fisheries Act. 
It is this boney and condemning finger that best expresses the 
type of inconsistency that arises between the Driftnet Fisheries Act 
and the terms of GATT. The Act may be viewed by other nations 
as another example of the United States seeking to achieve global 
environmental goals through the use of unilateral action. More-
over, in light of the 1991 panel decision, the passage of the Act 
might provide a signal as to how seriously the United States views 
its obligations under GAIT and the authority of GAIT. Such a 
signal may have the unforeseen effect of undermining the interna-
tional free trade policy that the United States has worked to 
construct. 
V. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCONSISTENCY· 
BETWEEN 1991 GATT PANEL DECISION AND 1992 
DRIFTNET FISHERIES ACT 
Although the passage of the Driftnet Fisheries Act, for the 
reasons discussed above, will be viewed negatively by much of the 
international community, it seems unlikely that the Act's validity 
will be directly challenged. This is not because the world commu-
nity now has decided that the United States is free unilaterally to 
Bush's opposition to the MMP A style conservation-based sanctions, there were good rea-
sons for Waxman's skepticism and concern. 
71. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the GAIT Panel 
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dictate international conservation policy or because the findings of 
the 1992 panel have been reassessed. Rather, a direct challenge of 
the Driftnet Fisheries Act seems unlikely because of the interna-
tional consensus that pelagic driftnetting should be prohibited. 
This consensus was expressed most clearly in United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions 44/225, 44/197, and 46/215.75 These 
international resolutions called for a worldwide moratorium on all 
high seas driftnet fishing by December 31, 1992. Moreover, Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, the three nations who had most actively 
employed the driftnet fishing technique, have recently announced 
their intention to discontinue the practice.76 The Driftnet Fisheries 
Act can, and in all probability will, be seen as a means of encourag-
ing global compliance with these resolutions and announcements. 77 
The international circumstances surrounding the Driftnet 
Fisheries Act are, therefore, quite different than those of the 
MMP A. While there may have been a general consensus that na-
tions should not plunder the resources of the high seas, this consen-
sus was too vague and aspirational to justify the specific 
requirements set forth in the MMP A. The domestic standards of 
the MMP A were thus sailing one boat ahead of the developing in-
ternational consensus. The Driftnet Fisheries Act, however, ap-
pears to be sailing perfectly even with the global position. For this 
reason, it seems unlikely that a challenge, such as the one brought 
by Mexico in 1991, will be brought before GATT.78 Moreover, 
even if such a challenge were brought, it would certainly fail to 
provoke the same international response.79 
The practical consequence of the inconsistency between 
GATT and the Driftnet Fisheries Act is likely, therefore, to be nil. 
The global consensus on the issue, and the passage of accompany-
ing UN resolutions, will have the effect of discouraging any formal 
challenge. The Driftnet Fisheries Act, the UN Resolutions, the 
GATT free trade provisions, and the 1991 GAIT panel ruling will 
all survive as valid domestic and international law. Despite the 
75. See UN General Resolution, supra note 58. 
76. See UN General Resolution, supra note 58. In addition to being signatories to. the 
UNGA Resolution these nations have made announcements in regards to their intent to 
discontinue pelagic driftnetting. 
77. Telephone Interveiw with Gerry Leap, conservation lobbyist for Greenpeace In-
ternational in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 1, 1993). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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lack of any discernible consequences, the inconsistencies and dis-
parities remain. 
VI. STRATEGIES FOR REsOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTALLy-BASED TRADE 
EMBARGOES AND INTERNATIONAL FREE 
TRADE OBLIGATIONS 
While the international circumstances surrounding the pas-
sage of the Driftnet Fisheries Act suggest that a repeat of the 1991 
Mexico-Tuna dispute will not be forthcoming, the conflict between 
domestic environmental legislation and international free trade ob-
ligations undoubtedly will resurface. In seeking a means to resolve 
such conflicts, the United States is presented with three primary 
alternatives. These alternatives are not mutually exclusive and may 
be used in conjunction with one another. For purposes of analysis, 
however, they are considered best independently. 
First, the United States can modify its own environmental 
laws so that they conform to the GATT standards of international 
trade. This was the approach advocated by the Bush Administra-
tion and the U.S. Trade Representative.so So far, however, this 
strategy has yet to be incorporated into any federal legislation or 
amendments. The lack of enthusiasm for this first alternative is 
understandable from both a conservationist and an economic per-
spective. The problem with this internal modification strategy is 
that it tends to reduce domestic environmental laws to the lowest 
common international denominator.81 This downward leveling oc-
curs because the only environmental standards accepted by the en-
tire international community are those standards that are 
acceptable to less-developed, less conservation-minded nations. S2 
Amending domestic conservation legislation, such as the MMP A, 
could have, therefore, the double-negative effect of furthering the 
degradation of the global environment while simultaneously plac-
ing American producers in an economically disadvantageous 
position. 83 
80. See Latty B. Stammer, White House Urges End to Ban on Mexican Tuna, L.A. 
Times, March 5, 1992, at A3. This article discusses Bush Administration's dislike of uni-
lateral global conservation measures, such as those required under the MMP A. 
81. See Hooley, supra note 16, at 491. "[T]he country with the least environmental 
protection enjoys an advantage in international trade." 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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Second, the United States can push for changes in GATT and 
the international trade structure so that proper consideration is 
given to environmental concerns. This strategy appears to provide 
the best prospect for a lasting and comprehensive solution, and 
plans already are underway to initiate such reform. Senator Max 
Baucus has proposed that GATT supplement its primary agree-
ment with a GATT Environmental Code.84. The problem with 
such a proposal, however, lies in the likelihood and time-frame of 
its adoption. GATT is not known for its ability to respond quickly 
or at all, a tendency that has led some to refer to the organization 
as the "General Agreement to Talk and Talk. "8S Moreover, a re-
cent GATT study, entitled "Trade and the Environment," con-
cluded that it is environmental treaties and domestic legislation 
that are in need of reform, not GATT.86 Such outward-looking 
conclusions indicate GA TI's unwillingness to respond to and in-
corporate environmental considerations. Thus, while reforms, such 
as the one put forth by Senator Baucus, make good sense, it re-
mains to be seen if and when such reforms will be adopted. While 
this waiting occurs, the environmental degradation and destructive 
resource exploitation continues. 
The third alternative can best be described as a non-alterna-
tive. This strategy employs the rather crude technique of simply 
disregarding the authority of GA TI panel rulings. At present, this 
seems to be the primary chosen response of the United States. The 
MMP A embargo provisions remain in place, and the Driftnet Fish-
eries Act has adopted the very sanctions that were disallowed by 
the 1991 panel decision. This solution, given the political dynamics 
of the driftnet issue, will not blossom into the flower of incoherence 
that its logic suggests. Therefore, it will serve the short-term goal 
of preserving the validity of domestic environmental legislation. 
84. 137 CONGo REC. 13, 169 (Daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Baucus). 
The Baucus plan called for an GATT Environmental Code that would enjoy a legal status 
parallel to that of the GATT Subsidies Code. This new code would allow each country to 
set its own environmental standards, with countervailing import duties permissible under 
certain limited conditions. 
85. See David Wirth, Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. ReV. 535, 55g (1992). Comment was made not in reference 
to the adoption of the Baucus Environmental Code, but rather in reference to drawn-out, 
long-winded negotiations regarding in the Uruguay Round. The description, however, 
seems equally applicable in the present context. 
86. "Trade and the Environment" (GATT, 1992). For an excellent analysis of the 
inadequacies of this report, see Hamilton Southworth, "GATT and the Environment", 32 
VIRG. J. INT'L. L. 997 (1992) 
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However, this third alternative may have some dangerous long-
term effects. Foremost among these effects is the weakening of the 
validity and respect for international agreements and international 
law. 
Because any permanent solution to worldwide environmental 
degradation will require the cooperation of nations and an accom-
panying respect for international agreements, this long-term effect 
is particularly dangerous. If the United States maintains, through 
its actions, that it has no obligation to abide by GATT rulings, than 
why should other nations feel obliged to abide by their interna-
tional commitments? The United States approach sets a precedent 
that may injure not only free trade but the conservationist agenda 
set forth at last year's United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio De Janeiro. In short, those environmen-
talists who advocate an open disregard of the 1991 GATT panel 
ruling might be losing the war for the sake of a single battle. The 
disregard of free trade agreements today could pave the way for the 
disregard of wildlife and deforestation agreements tomorrow. Such 
a result would be ironic, given the objectives of those who have 
supported this third alternative, but it would not be unforeseeable. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent passage of the 1992 Driftnet Fisheries Act gives 
further evidence of the tense and uncertain relationship that exists 
between domestic environmental legislation and GATT free trade 
obligations. Although the issue often has been framed as a struggle 
between natural conservation and economic development,87 such a 
characterization fails to adequately reveal many of the essential dy-
namics of the problem. It is not simply a question of striking a 
balance between conservation and trade; it is a question of who 
will, or who should, do this striking. 
Through the adoption of the Driftnet Fisheries Act, the 
United States has declared that it will continue to promote global 
conservation through statutorily-mandated trade sanctions. The 
Act thus supports the position that nations are free to unilaterally 
seek international environmental protection. Through its ruling in 
87. See Schoenbaum, supra note 12, at 700. This article discusses the widely held 
conservationist view view that free trade "blindly fosters the exploitation of natural re-
sources." It similarly discusses GAIT advocates inability to confront the "necessity and 
immediacy" of global environmental protection. 
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the 1991 Mexican tuna dispute, GATT has declared that such do-
mestic measures are inconsistent with the requirements of interna-
tional free trade. 88 This ruling holds that such unilateral action 
should be disallowed. These two pronouncements continue to co-
exist, and this strange and irreconcilable co-existence underscores 
the legal uncertainty of their relationship. 
Perhaps this uncertainty will be resolved by a modification of 
domestic legislation. Perhaps, and hopefully, it will be resolved by 
a modification of GAIT. Until some resolution or synthesis oc-
curs, however, national environmental legislation and GAIT will 
continue as legal ships that pass in the night. One ship has set sail 
for the seas of global conservation, the other for the seas of interna-
tional free trade. Unless efforts are made to place these ships on a 
somewhat consistent course, the present uncertainty seems likely to 
continue and increase. Because this uncertainty poses dangers to 
conservationists and free trade advocates alike, developing a solu-
tion should be a priority of both. 
88. GAlT Mexican Tuna Panel, supra note 3 . 
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